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COMMENTS
THE COMPLETION OF DEED FORMS BY
REAL ESTATE BROKERS
The phrase, practice of law, does not have a precise definition which
serves as a panacea for the solution of all problems arising out of the un-
authorized practice of law. It is generally conceded that the practice of
law is not confined to the area of litigation, but extends to much of the
office work of an attorney, including conveyancing.' Under Anglo-
American jurisprudence, all men possess legal rights and are bound by
legal duties. Since it is a practical impossibility for all men to be con-
versant with all of their legal rights and duties, certain qualified men,
learned in the law and subject to a rigorous code of ethics, are permitted
to give advice and take action affecting the legal rights of others. This
method is necessary to secure for all men a realization of theoretical
legal rights contained in the law. The practice of dealing in a repre-
sentative capacity with the legal rights of others is termed the practice
of law. This area must perforce be limited to lawyers; not to assure a
monopoly to those practicing law, but to protect the public from relying
upon incompetents in regard to their legal rights. The practicing of law
by a layman is called the unauthorized practice of law. It has been sug-
gested that a broker may be practicing law, and yet not be guilty of the
unauthorized practice of law.2 This distinction is semantical. The con-
siderations are the same regardless of which way the problem is
phrased.3
The overwhelming weight of authority asserts that the primary
power to control the unauthorized practice of law rests in the judicial
branch of the government. 4 The function of an attorney, whether it be
before the courts or in his office, is an integral part of the administration
of justice which is vested in the judiciary under the separation of pow-
ers doctrine. While the legislative branches of the states have passed
statutes regulating the unauthorized practice of law, it is generally held
that these statutes are an aid to the judicial branch of the state govern-
' Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 606, 194 N.E. 313, 317 (1935).
2 Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398,
312 P. 2d 998 (1957).
3 Petitions of Ingham County Bar Ass'n, 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W. 2d 713 (1955).
4 People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931);
Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940); Washington State
Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 251 P. 2d 619(1952) ; State (ex. re. Junior Ass'n of the Milwaukee Bar) v. Rice, 236 Wis.
38, 294 N.W. 550 (1940) ; New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey
Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A. 2d 257 (1960).
5 Opinion of the Justices, supra note 1, at 317 where the court states: "The
work of the office lawyer is the groundwork for future possible contests in
courts. It has a profound affect on the whole scheme of the administration
of justice."
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ment in its regulation of the unauthorized practice of law." It may be
argued that the legislature is in a better position to ascertain the needs
of the public because of its widespread representation, and hence should
control the unauthorized practice of law through its police power. How-
ever, in the area of the unauthorized practice of law there is more at stake
than public welfare. There is at stake the due administration of justice
which is vested in the courts. A small percentage of legal controversy is
actually settled in the courtroom, when compared to out-of-court settle-
ments. The courts view the office work of an attorney as an integral
part of the administration of justice, because in reality that is where
much of it takes place. The courts would be fulfilling only part of their
constitutional responsibility if they did not take jurisdiction over the
administration of justice outside of the courtroom. The unauthorized
practice of law is not only a danger to the public, but also to the courts
insofar as it affects the function of the judiciary. Attorneys practice
under a rigorous code of ethics because they act as officers of the court
who aid the judiciary in its task. For the legislature to set the standards
of legal practice would be to deprive the courts of control of the tools
necessary to perform its duty.7 Since the judicial branch of the govern-
ment has the power to control the practice of law in its jurisdiction, it is
also charged with the duty to do so, a duty which cannot be taken lightly.,
A current problem in the field of unauthorized practice of law is
whether a real estate broker who fills in blank spaces on a form deed,
without extra compensation, in a transaction in which he is acting as a
broker, is guilty of the unauthorized practice of law. It is the purpose
6 Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 2.
7 "Having power to determine who shall and who shall not practice law in
this state, and to license those who may act as attorneys and forbid others
who do not measure up to the standards or come within the provisions of
its rules, it necessarily follows that this court has the power to enforce its
rules and decisions against offenders, even though they have never been
licensed by this court. Of what avail is the power to license in the absence
of power to prevent one not licensed from practicing as an attorney? In the
absence of power to control or punish unauthorized persons who presume to
practice as attorneys and officers of this court the power to control admissions
to the bar would be nugatory....
"It is also argued that for acts outside of court which amount to un-
authorized practice of law the offender cannot be punished for contempt of
this or any other court. What we have said above should be sufficient to dis-
pose of this contention. To deny the power of the court to deal with such
offenders would be tantamount to a destruction of the power itself. Perhaps
the major portion of the actual practice of law under modern conditions con-
sists of the work of attorneys outside of any court and has nothing to do with
court proceedings." People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176
N.E. 901, 906 (1931).
8"The bench and bar may not lightly disregard these public obligations. Nor,
in default of duty, may they casually permit the public to be led to rely upon
the counselling, in matters of law, of persons not subject to the standards and
discipline of an attorney as imposed by law for the public protection." Beach
Abstract & Guarantee Co. v. Bar Ass'n of Arkansas, 326 S.W. 2d 900, 904
(Ark. 1959).
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of this article to examine this problem from the viewpoint of the public
interest which by necessity must be the controlling consideration.
PRIOR DECISIONS
In Cowern v. Nelson,9 the defendant appealed from a judgment re-
straining him from performing certain acts held by the trial court to
constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The defendant was a real
estate broker who prepared purchase money contracts, contracts for
deeds, leases, notes, mortgages, chattel mortgages, bills of sale, deeds,
assignments and satisfactions. In some cases he performed this service
while not engaged as a broker in the transaction. Occasionally he re-
ceived compensation for the preparation of the papers. The instruments
were those commonly used in the legal profession. He personally se-
lected the form, determined its suitability, and advised the interested
parties as to the legality and legal effect of the instrument. On appeal,
the defendant conceded that a fee could not be charged, and accepted
the trial court's judgment insofar as it applied to transactions in which
he was not acting as a broker. He defended on the ground that his ac-
tivity was authorized by statute.'0 Although the defendant recognized
that the legislature could not authorize the practice of law by a layman,
he contended that as a matter of comity the judicial branch should defer
to the legislative declaration of policy. The plaintiff contended that the
acts of the defendant constituted the unlawful practice of law, and
insofar as the statute permitted them, it was unconstitutional.
The Minnesota court accepted the statute on the grounds of comity,
but rejected that portion of the statute which provided that a fee could
be charged. The court went on to say that a decision of this type could
not be based solely upon the character of the instrument involved and
whether or not a broker is either technically or practically a party to
the transaction. The court held ordinary conveyancing to be within an
area between what was clearly the unauthorized practice of law and
what was clearly permissible. Placing great emphasis on the burden
which would fall upon the public if brokers were enjoined from per-
forming this service, the court reasoned that the legal profession could
not claim a necessity for judicial restraint. Reversing the trial court,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota declared that the possible harm which
might come to the public by defective conveyances prepared by brokers
was not sufficient to outweigh the public inconvenience which would
follow if it were necessary to call in a lawyer to draft simple instru-
9 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).
10 MINN. SESs. LAWs 1931, ch. 114 §1 (c) which reads in part: "... and shall
not prohibit anyone, acting as a broker for the parties or agent of one of
the parties to a sale or trade or lease of property or to a loan, from drawing
or assisting in drawing, with or without charge therefor, such papers as may
be incident to such sale, trade, lease, or loan."
1961]
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ments. The court concluded by holding that a broker, in a transaction
in which he was acting as a broker, could fill in simple instruments as
long as he charged no extra fee.
The Supreme Court of Missouri reached the same result in the case
of Hulse v. Criger.11 This case arose from an information by the Ad-
visory Committee of the Missouri Bar Administration alleging that the
defendant, a licensed real estate broker, engaged in the unlawful prac-
tice of law as a practice and as a business. The defendant admitted that
he selected and filled in blanks on form instruments, and admitted that he
charged a nominal fee. The defendant denied that he gave legal advice
as to the effect of the instrument. The defendant contended that his con-
duct did not constitute the unlawful practice of law.
In upholding the contention of the broker, except as to the charging
of a fee, the Missouri Supreme Court placed emphasis on the position
of the broker in a real estate transaction. The court did not hold that
the broker was a party to the transaction, but the decision implied as
much. Technically, the broker merely by his status as a broker for the
seller could not be a party to the transaction. However, the court seemed
to be impressed with the broker's pecuniary interest in the closing. It
observed that as a practical matter a broker does not get paid until the
deal is closed. Moreover, the court believed that general warranty deed
and trust deed forms were so standardized that to complete them for
usual transactions required ordinary intelligence rather than legal train-
ing. The criteria applied by the court was whether or not the service
was incidental to the broker's business.
An aspect of the problem considered extensively by the court was
the effect of advice given by a broker to the parties concerning the legal
results of an instrument and the legal rights and obligations of the
parties. The court unequivocally condemned such conduct as the un-
lawful practice of law. It based its conclusion on two grounds, the lack
of legal training which renders brokers incompetent for such work and
the conflict of interest to which brokers are subject by virtue of their
own pecuniary interest. 2 Although the court held that the filling in of
standardized forms by a broker in a transaction in which he is acting
as a broker, without charging a fee, did not constitute the unlawful
practice of law, the court stated that only such information as was nec-
essary for the filling in of the blanks could be elicited by the broker. The
consistency of this portion of the decision was subsequently criticized
in a case arising in the state of Washington. 13
Relying to a great extent on Cowern v. Nelson,'- and Hulse v.
"363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W. 2d 855 (1952).
12 Id. at 861.
13 See note 32 infra.
14 Supra note 9.
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Criger,15 the Michigan Supreme Court distinguished a prior case'8 and
concluded in Petitions of Ingham County Bar Association7 that the
filling in of form instruments by a broker did not constitute the un-
authorized practice of law as long as the broker was handling the trans-
action as broker. The Michigan court examined its statutes dealing with
the unauthorized practice of law'I and the regulation of real estate
brokers.' 9 The court was of the opinion that while the statutes did not
define the practice of law, they revealed, at least, the right of realtors
to engage in conveyancing. It then assumed the burden of deciding
whether the filling in of the forms constituted the unlawful practice of
law. Viewing the problem in light of public convenience, the court held
that the service did not constitute the unlawful practice of law. Justice
Sharpe dissented vigorously, pointing out that "in practically every real
estate transaction the attorney is required to give advice concerning
some phase of the transaction."2 0 He also observed that a substantial
number of cases in the courts of the state were brought about by in-
competent preparation of a legal instrument. This observation should
be contrasted with that of the Minnesota court in Cowern v. Nelson2
where the court held the relative danger to the public to be slight.
The Colorado court in Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v.
Denver Bar Associaton22 faced problems peculiar to its jurisdiction
when it considered the question of conveyancing by brokers. The com-
plaint alleged that the defendants, licensed real estate brokers, had been
engaged in the unlawful practice of law by preparing for others in-
struments relating to and affecting title to real estate. The defendants
charged no separate fee, but acted as brokers in the transactions. The
complaint also alleged that the brokers advised the parties as to the legal
effect of the instruments. The defendants admitted the allegations of
the complaint, but contended that their actions were a reasonable and
necessary incident to their business. The defendants argued that public
convenience required that they be allowed to fill in approved legal
forms. They also testified that, upon inquiry, they would explain the
difference between joint tenancy and tenancy in common, and the dif-
ference between assuming and taking subject to an incumbrance.
The Colorado court thus phrased the first question raised by the
parties:
Does the preparation of receipts and options, deeds, promissory
15 Supra note 11.
16Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939)
which was distinguished on the basis of the incidental-to-the-business test.
17 Supra note 3.
18 MicH. CoMp. LAWS ch. 601, §601.61 (1948).
19 MicH. CoAip. LAws ch. 451, §451.208 (1948).
2o Supra note 3, at 722.
21 Supra note 9.
2 2Supra note 2.
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notes, deeds of trust, mortgages, releases of encumbrances, leases,
notice terminating tenancies, demands to pay rent or vacate by
completing standard and approved printed forms, coupled with
the giving of explanation or advice as to the legal effect thereof,
constitute the practice of law?
This question we answer in the affirmative.
23
The court held that the drafting of any one of the enumerated instru-
ments and advising as to the legal effect thereof might present a simple
legal problem or a complex one.-In either case, it would constitute the
practice of law. Notwithstanding this interpretation, the court refused
to enjoin the brokers from this practice. The court used three reasons
to justify their position. First, it accepted the incidental test, pointing
out that according to a Colorado statute24 a broker generally was not
entitled to his commission until the sale was consummated. Hence, the
completion of the forms was definitely incidental to the brokers' pro-
fession. Second, it was not in the public interest to grant an injunction
because in three counties there were no attorneys, in ten counties there
was only one attorney, and in seven counties there were only two at-
torneys. The court granted that the plaintiffs had much logic in support
of their contention, but concluded that reason, public convenience and
public welfare were on the other side.
The third reason presented by the court was phrased as follows:
We feel that to grant the injunctive relief requested, thereby deny-
ing to the public the right to conduct real estate transactions in
the manner in which they have been transacted for over half a
century, with apparent satisfaction, and requiring all such trans-
actions to be conducted through lawyers, would not be in the
public interest... [emphasis added] .25
This statement seems to be based on a freedom of contract theory, a
freedom with which courts will not interfere without grave cause. It is
difficult to ascertain the weight to be accorded this statement in light of
the peculiar context in which the court was deciding the case.
Although the Conway-Bogue2 6 case ruled in favor of the brokers, it
is somewhat inconsistent with Hulse v. Criger.2 7 It should be noted that
the Missouri court was strongly against any advice given by brokers to
the parties concerning their legal rights. This did not seem to disturb
the Colorado court.
Limited relief was granted in Washington State Bar Association v.
Washington Association of Realtors.8 Originally the action was brought
against all the brokers in the state, but at the trial level it was reduced
23 Id. at 1004-05.
24 CoLo. REV. STAT. ch. 117, §117-2-1 (1953).
25 Supra note 2, at 1007.
2 Supra note 2.
27 Supra note 11.
2841 Wash. 2d 697, 251 P. 2d 619 (1952).
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to an action against one defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant prepared two real estate purchase contracts and five warranty
deeds. The defendant did not question on appeal the trial court finding
that he prepared the four deeds in evidence, but he contended that since
he received no compensation he was not guilty of the unlawful practice
of law. The decision of the court centered around one of the deeds in
evidence. This deed, the Voeller-Newman deed, was a statutory war-
ranty deed which contained the following language after the property
description:
Subject: To a $4,000 mortgage held by Public Service Life,
Health and Accident Company.
A mortgage of $850.29
The earnest money receipt indicated that the mortgages were to be
assumed.
The court began by asserting that no statutory violation need be
shown because of the court's inherent power to punish or restrain the
unauthorized practice of law. The mere fact that no compensation was
received did not absolve the defendant.30 The court noted the division
of authority on the question of preparation of deeds by brokers and
declined to refer to other cases, stating that each court must resolve the
problem as it deems proper. In addition to asserting its inherent power
to restrain those who might harm the public because of their lack of
professional skill, whether they be members of the bar or not, the court
recognized that it had a duty to do so. Before disposing of the case, the
court listed the considerations which inhered in the case:
1. The representation of qualification and competence to do work
of a legal nature and to advise upon that subject, which is im-
plicit in the preparation of any legal document by the selection
and completion of a blank form.
2. The presence of ethical problems of conflict of interest which
must be considered.
3. The fact that no sound distinction can be drawn between a
simple and complex instrument.31
Since the court was reluctant to use its inherent power unless abso-
lutely necessary, it issued an injunction prohibiting the broker from
preparing such instruments as represented by the Voeller-Newman deed.
justice Donworth, in a concurring opinion,32 took the position that the
court should have issued a broader injunction so as to preclude brokers
from filling in legal documents.
29 Id. at 626.
30 Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. 2d 401 (1932) was overruled insofar
as it held compensation to be an element of the unauthorized practice of law.
31 Supra note 28, at 621, 622.
-2 Justice Donworth attacked the reasoning in Hulse v. Criger, supra note 11,
on the ground that the selection of the form by the broker constituted giving
legal advice which the Missouri court was strongly against.
19611
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The strongest ruling against brokers33 was handed down in Arkansas
Bar Association v. Block.3 4 In that case, the court listed twenty-four
types of legal instruments, 35 and held that brokers would be engaging
in the unlawful practice of law if they filled out any one of these instru-
ments, notwithstanding the fact that they were acting as brokers and
receiving no extra compensation. The court asserted that the practice
of law included in its scope the office work of an attorney. The court
dismissed the concept of simple instrument saying that any legal form
must be adapted skillfully to a transaction. Underlying the court's de-
cision was a theory expressed in an earlier New York case:
... a very little can go wrong in a court where the proceedings are
public, and the presiding officer is generally a man of judgement
and experience. . . . Not so in the office. . . . Ignorance and
stupidity may here create damage which the courts of the land
cannot thereafter undo.
3 6
The emphasis of the court was on public protection rather than public
convenience.
THE SITUATION IN WISCONSIN
The only case in Wisconsin dealing with the filling in of form deeds
by real estate brokers is the Cunningham-Nield Realty Co. 3 7 case. In
that case, the Circuit Court of Kenosha County held that Cunningham-
Nield had violated the Wisconsin statute38 prohibiting the advertising of
one's self as capable of performing legal work. The company in their
advertising had stated that they performed all the work necessary to
close the deal. Justice Baker, in writing his opinion, declared that he
believed that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would follow Arkansas Bar
3 A position contrary to brokers was also taken in: In re Gore, 58 Ohio App.
79, 15 N.E. 2d 968 (1937); Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So. 2d
605 (Fla. 1950); Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, Inc., 186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.
2d 720 (1947).
34 323 S.W. 2d 912 (Ark. 1959).
35 Id. at 913-14. Warranty deeds, disclaimer deeds, quitclaim deeds, joint tenancy
deeds, leases, options, easements, loan applications, promissory notes, real
estate mortgages, deeds of trust, assignments of leases or rentals, contracts of
sale of real estate, release and satisfactions of real estate mortgages, agree-
ments for the sale of real estate, bills of sale, contracts of sale, mortgages,
pledges of personal property, notices and declarations of forfeiture, notices
requiring strict compliance, releases and discharges of mechanic's and ma-
terialmen's liens, printed forms approved by attorneys, including the various
forms furnished by title insurance companies to defendants for use by de-
fendants as agents of title insurance companies, and acting as closing agents
for mortgage loans and completing by filling in the blanks therein with factual
data such instruments as are furnished to them and are necessary and in-
cidental and ancillary to the closing of the transaction between the mortgagee
for whom they act as agent and the mortgagor.
36 People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 339-40, 125 N.E. 671, 673 (1919).
37 State of Wisconsin ex rel. State Bar of Wisconsin and Kenosha County Bar
Ass'n v. Cunningham-Nield Realty, Inc., Kenosha County Circuit Court, Feb.
10, 1960.
38 Wis. STAT., §256.30 (1959).
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Ass'n v. Block." On April 11, 1960, the Attorney General of Wisconsin
rendered an opinion40 to the effect that the Cunningham-Nield case was
the law of Wisconsin. He considered it essential to the decision that
filling in of form deeds constitutes the practice of law, otherwise there
would be no harm in advertising the practice. The Real Estate Brokers
Board responded by amending Rule 5.04 of the Wisconsin Administra-
tive Code"1 in such a manner as to make it clear that in the opinion of
the Board the brokers could fill in form instruments as long as they
were legally approved forms. The ultimate resolution of the issue has
devolved upon the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.' 2
ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
Several theories have appeared in the foregoing cases which bear
analysis. The standard by which these theories must be judged is the
public interest. Above all, it must be realized that the problem cannot
be solved by the use of cliches.
It has been held that the filling in of a form deed in order to transfer
title in the closing of a real estate transaction is incidental to the main
business of a real estate broker and therefore does not constitute the
unauthorized practice of law 3 In Gardner v'. ConWay,4" a case involv-
ing a tax consultant, the Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that
the incidental-to-the-business test had no value except in a negative
sense, namely that legal services of a layman if not performed as an
incident to his business were definitely the practice of law, but the mere
fact that they were incidental to his business did not mean that the acts
did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The court disposed
of the rule saying, "Any rule which holds that a layman who prepares
legal papers or furnishes other services of a legal nature is not practic-
ing law when such services are incidental to another business or pro-
39 Supra note 34.
40 49 Wis. Op. Atty. Gen. 79.
41 Wis. ADm. CODE §R.E.B. 5.04 (2):
"Real estate or business opportunity brokers, in transactions in which they
are acting as a broker may use standardized forms, as set forth in subsec-
tion (1), of deeds, land contracts, leases, options, mortgages, assignments of
mortgages and land contracts, releases of mortgages, chattel mortgages, bills
of sale, conditional sales contracts and other instruments of a similar nature,
provided, however, that such are appropriate and incidental to transactions
in which they act as licensed brokers, and that said brokers receive no com-
pensation for filling in or completing such forms. The broker may not do so
in any other transactions. Said forms shall not, however, be prepared by
salesmen."
42 A case involving the validity of R.E.B. 5.04 is now before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.
43 Petitions of Ingham Cty. Bar Ass'n, supra note 3.
44 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W .2d 788 (1951). In this case the court adopted the complex
legal question test. It noted its earlier acceptance of the incidental to the
business test in Cowern v. Nelson, supra note 9, but held that the new test
would produce the same result in the case of a broker. The weakness of the
complex legal question test is that a broker may not have the legal back-
ground necessary to perceive the presence of a complex legal question.
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fession completely ignores the public welfare. '45 Similarly, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court has held that one engaged in rendering legal
services cannot claim immunity on the ground that such service was
incidental to his main business." The danger to the public arising from
the unauthorized practice of law is not lessened by the mere fact that
it is carried on as an incident to another business. Moreover, it is not
necessary for a real estate broker to fill in the forms which convey title
to property in order to receive his commission. His work is complete
when he has found a buyer ready, willing and able to purchase.17 The
business of a broker is not affected if he is barred from filling in the
deeds in a real estate transaction. The substantial effect which does
result is the protection of the public.
One of the elements which always receives attention in unauthorized
practice of law cases involving the filling in of form instruments is
whether or not a separate charge is made for the service. Cases which
hold that a broker can fill in forms to effectuate a conveyance of title
invariably hold that he may not charge for this service. This position
is difficult to sustain unless this service constitutes the practice of law,
otherwise there could be no prohibition against charging a fee. Whether
or not a fee is charged may, however, have a bearing on the question
of whether the service is rendered incidental to the broker's business.
If substantial income is derived from fees, the service could not be ex-
plained away as an incident of other business. Under this rationale, it
would seem that a nominal charge would not destroy the incidental cri-
terion and hence would be permissible. But the courts will not tolerate
even a nominal charge for this service.4 9 In any event the public is in
no way safeguarded by the compensation test. As the Supreme Court
of Washington pointed out: "The probability of injurious consequences
from the acts of the unskilled is shown by the constant stream of litiga-
tion arising from this source. These consequences are not made less
probable, nor are their results less severe, because the unskilled are not
paid for their services. ' 50 There is also a serious contention that the
brokers do receive compensation in an indirect form. The rendering of
legal services in the form of conveyancing is used as a leader to bring
lucrative business to the broker. Hence, the fact that no monetary charge
is made does not of itself indicate a gratuitous service. 51
Some courts attempt to draw a distinction between a complex legal
15 Id. at 795.
46 State ex rel. Junior Ass'n of the Milwaukee Bar v. Rice, 236 Wis. 38, 294
N.W. 550 (1940).
47 Niske v. Nackman, 273 Wis. 69, 76 N.W. 2d 591 (1956).
48 Hulse v. Criger, supra note 11.
49 Ibid.
50 Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, supra note 28,
at 621.
51 Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee, 142 Tex. 506, 179
S.W. 2d 946 (1944).
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instrument and a simple legal instrument, holding that the execution of
the latter does not constitute the practice of law. 2 It is urged that since
it requires no special legal aptitude to fill in blank spaces on approved
legal forms, this work is merely clerical. The crucial question at this
point is whether the public generally views this service as being merely
clerical, or whether the public relies on the broker for more than
the use of his spelling ability. For the most part, people have few en-
counters with conveyancing in their lifetime, and they respect the
broker as a man who is constantly engaged in real estate transactions.
It is easy for the uninitiated to confuse skill in selling real estate-with
skill in conveying it. Even though the broker says nothing, the parties
to the transaction will believe that by filling in the form instrument
which he has chosen the broker is effectuating their intent and doing
what is best for them.53 This is the epitome of unauthorized law prac-
tice, for they are relying on a third party who is unskilled in the law in
matters affecting substantial legal rights. By filling in the conveyance,
the broker not only lulls the parties into a false sense of security, but
affirmatively affects their legal rights. Good faith on the part of the
broker is no substitute for legal knowledge. justice Pound, in repudi-
ating the distinction between simple and complex legal instruments, ob-
served: "The most complex are simple to the skilled, and the simplest
often trouble the inexperienced." 54 The distinction is of no avail be-
cause simplicity and complexity do not lie in the instrument per se, but
in the situation of the parties. A broker does not have the legal educa-
tion necessary to evaluate properly the legal position of the parties, and
the use of a simple instrument does not overcome this deficiency.
It might be well at this point to raise some of the legal considerations
of conveyancing which must be kept in mind by a conveyancer in order
to protect adequately the overall legal position of the parties. These con-
siderations apply also to the "simple" instruments which brokers main-
tain they have a right to execute. One of the basic questions which must
be answered if an existing mortgage is involved is whether the buyer
is assuming the mortgage or taking subject to it. What are the legal
obligations of the buyer in each case? Is one method more advantageous
to the seller? The case of Washington State Bar Assn v. Washington
Ass'n of Realtors55 presents a good example of the turmoil which can
result if these questions cannot be answered by the conveyancer.
Another aspect of conveyancing is whether title to the property
should be held by one person in severalty, or in a joint tenancy, or in a
tenancy in common. Many laymen know that the principal difference
between a joint tenancy and tenancy in common is that the former has
52 People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919).
53 30 U. DEr. LJ. 94 (1953).
54 Supra note 52, at 670.
55 Supra note 28.
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as an incident the right of survivorship. Can the right of survivorship
be defeated by the conveyance of one joint tenant? Will it make any
difference if the property is also a homestead? Can the right of survivor-
ship be defeated by will? Is it possible for a gift tax liability to arise
immediately by the placing of property in joint tenancy? If the husband
pays all of the consideration for the property will he still have to pay
state inheritance tax if his wife predeceases him? Under Federal tax
law is it possible that the entire joint tenancy will be included in the
wife's estate even though the husband paid the entire consideration?
What deductions can be taken from joint tenancy property for the pur-
pose of computing state inheritance tax? Is the effective use of the
Federal estate tax marital deduction hampered by joint tenancy? These
numerous tax considerations must be made known to the parties before
they can make a sound decision as to the manner in which the property
should be held. In addition to the foregoing, there are also many basic
questions concerning dower rights, property description, the proper nam-
ing of the parties, and the selection of the correct instrument which re-
quire the learning of one skilled in the law for proper solution. These
problems cannot be handled as merely "clerical" problems which are
solved by a "simple" instrument.
Several courts have stated that public convenience requires that
brokers be allowed to fill in form conveyances.. 6 There are two elements
to be considered in analyzing public convenience, time and attorney
fees. In view of the lapse of time between the signing of the contract
and closing, it would seem as if there is ample time to obtain the neces-
sary services of an attorney to effectuate the conveyance. Therefore, the
time element sinks into insignificance. The question is reduced to whether
the public should be burdened with attorney fees when conveying real
estate. The question is best answered by another question. Should the
public be burdened with attorney fees when seeking representation in
court? In both cases legal rights are being substantially affected. It has
been pointed out previously that to work effectively our system of juris-
prudence demands that people be assured proper legal representation.
This basic proposition is not altered by the fact that the folly of the
people may dictate otherwise. It must be assumed that when a person
asks a broker to do this type of work he is seeking competence, other-
wise he would fill in the form himself. The point which is not under-
stood by the layman is that a knowledge of law in fields outside of the
immediate area of conveyancing is essential to adequately protect the
rights of the parties. To fully convince the public of this proposition
it would be necessary to educate them as to the multitudinous legal
ramifications which can be involved in a simple conveyance. This is
56 See Petitions of Ingham Cty. Bar Ass'n, supra note 3 and Hulse v. Criger,
supra note 11.
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impractical. Without this background, the public does not have the guide
necessary in determining if a broker can adequately protect their legal
rights. The public's freedom of choice in this case is interrupted be-
cause the courts realize that the public is being led astray by innocent
ignorance. The right of a party to a conveyance to assume the responsi-
bility of drafting a deed is not questioned. It is the intervention of third
parties which is the crux of the issue. If a third party is to intervene
and affect the legal rights of other people, it is fundamental that this
person be an attorney. The courts cannot jeopardize the due administra-
tion of justice by allowing the public to ignore this proposition.57 What-
ever inconvenience there may be is overshadowed by the consideration
of public welfare.
The fact that it has been the custom of the brokers in an area to
execute form conveyances seems to have influenced some courts.5 Any
argument based on custom is, at best, rhetorical, because an illegal act
does not become legal by virtue of its continued perpetration. Judicial
courage should not wane in the presence of custom.59
It appears that the theories advanced by the brokers are not sound
when viewed from the standpoint of public interest, and no combination
of these theories will produce a sound result. There is, however, an-
other reason for preventing brokers from filling in conveyancing forms.
A broker is employed by the seller and is paid a commission by the
seller. However, the instrument he drafts affects the legal rights of
both parties. This patently is a conflict of interest situation. The danger
to the public arising from the unauthorized practice of law becomes
intolerable when the person engaged in such practice is also acting under
a conflict of interest. Justice Donworth, in a concurring opinion, made
this quite clear: "Obviously, this court cannot permit an unlicensed lay-
man who is entirely unaware of the legal ethics involved to attempt to
fix the obligations of both parties inter se while being employed and paid
by only one of them.' 'e The broker's prime interest is to consummate
the sale and receive his commission.P' No attempt is made to disparage
the valuable service the real estate broker performs for society. How-
ever, the broker, above all, should be the first to realize that he is not
in a position of impartiality. To permit him to convey real estate under
these circumstances would be unwise. F1ANCIS J. SKIBA
57 See note 8 supra.
58 Conway-Bogue v. Denver Bar Ass'n, supra note 2 and Petitions of Ingham
Cty. Bar Ass'n, supra note 3.
59 Courts have recognized the presence of custom in cases ruling against brokers.
See cases cited at note 33 supra.6 0 Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, supra note
28, at 627.
61The court in Hulse v. Criger, supra note 11, viewed this same pecuniary
interest in a different light holding that it was one of the reasons a broker
should be able to fill in forms.
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